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This thesis offers a systematic review of the system of innovation (SI) literature, to bridge 
between Chinese innovation practice and global studies on innovation systems. It is developed 
from the standpoint of how to understand and evaluate innovation systems in China based on 
current wisdom. First, the Chinese innovation system, like its global counterparts, is a product of 
the concept that innovation is the major tool for development. As innovation becomes the center 
of development studies and globalization process intensifies competition between regions, places 
rely on SIs to stay competitive. Second, however, rationales of neoclassical and evolutionary 
approaches still compete within SI research, that it fails to provide with a set of concrete 
recommendations for Chinese policymakers to build innovation systems, and the Chinese 
environment in terms of culture, firm and governance structures challenges several key 
assumptions in SI literature. Third, the thesis categories three deficiencies in the current SI 
research: 1. Failed to incorporate innovation systems at different scales; 2. Very limited studies 
on experience outside of technologically advanced countries; 3. Overlooked the negative effect 
of SI development, such as the growing inequality. Then, it argues how studies on Chinese 
innovation systems would complement current studies.  
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Innovation and system, both terms are not new, even, as old as mankind itself. They seem 
to be the nature inherited from Homo sapiens with the tendency of working cooperatively and 
creatively to improve the living condition (Harari, 2014). Even when organized innovations have 
largely accelerated the development of the human world since about 500 years ago during the 
Scientific Revolution, they did not catch enough attention in academia. For a long time, capital 
and labor were regarded sorely as sources for development. Both theories and Chinese practices 
of innovation systems, the two objects of this thesis, only emerged in the last few decades. 
Studies on Innovation started in the 1960s, represented by the establishment of the 
Science Policy Research Unit at the University of Sussex. From then, research on innovations 
booms, a significant number of scholar articles entangle with the concept of innovation (Figure 
1) (Fagerberg, 2006). China Tried to transfer experience from Silicon Valley and Other regions 
to develop its own innovation systems to spur innovations for “modernization” on May 20, 1988, 
the day of the promulgation of The Provisional Regulations of Beijing Municipality Concerning 









Figure 1. The number of articles titled “innovation” in per thousand social science articles 
From: Fagerberg, 2006 
 
 
The Chinese innovation system represents the country’s rapid development. Forty years 
after its emergence, the national program of innovation systems (let along innovative clusters at 
levels of province, city, and county), High-Tech Industrial Development Zones (HIDZs), has 
produced 169 zones throughout China, incubated diverse high-tech industrial clusters such as 
information, biotechnology, and new industrial materials, and accounted for 45.1% of Enterprise 
R&D investment and 11.5% of national GDP. Addressing existed theoretical progress in SI 
studies is the first step to understand and theorize the Chinese experience of innovation 
development. 
According to Schumpeter, “Innovation” takes the broad meaning referring to all product 
and process innovation, including improvements in goods and services, as well as technological 
and organizational advancement (Equist, 2006). The terminology, “system of innovation” or 
innovation system (SI) is from the evolutionary innovation theorists, that all determinants of 
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innovation including economic, social, institutional, technological, and historical are 
interconnected and influence the innovation process (ibid.). The systematic approach reflects the 
rise of development studies as opposed to the previous view of linear technological change, 
which regards innovation as the direct result of the causal relationship with the increase in 
scientific input. On the contrary, from SI’s perspective, innovation is the result of a complex 
interaction between actors and institutions in the system (OECD, 1997). 
This thesis dissolves the inquiry of how to understand and theorize Chinese experience 
based on current SI research into three smaller questions: 1. What environment in which global 
and Chinese SI studies and practices arise? 2. How Chinese SI may learn from recommendations 
SI researchers have made? 3. Will Chinese experience complement global SI studies?  
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CHAPTER 1. INNOVATION AS THE TOOL FOR DEVELOPMENT 
 
It is commonly recognized that the primary driver of economic development in today’s 
world is not capital accumulation, according to classic economists, but the innovation (Johnson, 
2008). Innovation researchers do not talk about how this consensus was made, rather, directly 
place the practical needs at the forefront of their research (Doloreux & Porto Gomez, 2017).  
The urgent needs for innovation link closely to the overwhelming pursued of 
“development,” the concept originates from the development of capitalism in the historical 
process, and then refers the process through which the “Third World” try to catch up with the 
“First World” (Hart, 2001). The spread of the development concept relates to the colonial period 
(Mohan, 2010), during which the foreign concept of social development represented by material 
prosperity was implemented in countries like China.  
Innovation was gradually introduced to be the “golden” prescription towards higher 
development. Economists studying development, for over a century, overlooked the role played 
by innovation, rather, it is regarded as something actors can buy from somewhere, and what they 
need to think about is to maximize the use of capital and labors. After Schumpeter in the 1940s 
pioneeringly finds the innovation as the mean and end of economic development, the innovation 
ability is regarded as to reflect the developmental potential of the place and determine its 
economic development, especially in the long-term (Carlsson & Stankiewicz, 1991). Facing 




1. The constructed concept of “Development” 
Originally, the word development in the West describes the process in which an organism 
grows to its mature form, it could be either “successful” or “failure” form. It was in 1774, that 
Herder first applied the evolved biologist notion of “development”— the transformation process 
that results in an ever more perfect form of a creature, in into interpreting different stages of 
human society. The concept of development as the pattern of societal development of Western 
countries began to be a part of ordinary language in the 19th century. It set up a ranking for all 
countries according to their civilization and production levels. It travels to other cultures during 
the colonization period and once the concept was implemented there, the indigenous were 
deprived of defining their forms of social life (Sachs, 2008). Now, we are living in the age of 
“development” (Esteva, 1997), in which the reason behind every effort paid towards a “better 
life,” a higher position in the ranking, was self-evident. 
In the West, increasing productivity is a traditional solution for “development” that 
through “production” and then “distribution, and consumption of resources, and the management 
of state income and expenditure” the well-being and economic capabilities of a nation’s residents 
will be improved (Oxford Reference, 2020). Western economists offer standard models to 
achieve development.  
For Adam Smith, in his seminal book The Wealth of Nations, the wealth of a nation 
depends on its level of labor specialization. 
“First, to the increase of dexterity in every particular workman; secondly, 
to the saving of the time which is commonly lost in the passing from one species of 
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work to another; and lastly, to the invention of a great number of machines which 
facilitate and abridge labor, and enable one man to do the work of many.”  
(Smith 1776) 
Marshall (1920) summarizes Smith’s argument that the society benefits from the 
specialization through “differentiation” and “integration” process  
“This increased subdivision of functions, or “differentiation,” as it is 
called, manifests itself with regard to industry in such forms as the division of 
labor, and the development of specialized skill, knowledge and machinery: while 
“integration,” that is, a growing intimacy and firmness of the connections 
between the separate parts of the industrial organism, shows itself in such forms 
as the increase of security of commercial credit, and of the means and habits of 
communication by sea and road, by railway and telegraph, by post and printing-
press.” 
(Marshall 1920) 
Development economists followed Smith expanded on his work emphasizing the division 
of labor to considering the improvement of “allocative efficiency,” the way to produce more 
goods under the resource constraint (Libenstein et al., 1988). For instance, David Ricardo (1815) 
theorizes the production function as evidenced by English social-economic classes: working-
class, aristocracy, and merchant class. Hence, effectively allocating resources of labor, land, and 
capital would increase a society’s production. 
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Schumpeter brings a paradigm shift to the economic development study. Schumpeter 
draws a different picture of economic development—Economic development does not mean 
more production due to more input or intenser competition, rather, it is a fundamental 
transformation of an old model of economy to a new one. Schumpeter’s theory is based on the 
modern capitalist economies, which is different from classical economists’ competition theory 
that views the development process statically (Ziemnowicz, 2013). Schumpeter reckons that “the 
history of capitalism is studded with violent bursts and catastrophes” (Schumpeter, 1939) that 
capitalist economies evolve discontinuously. This disruptive innovation process is named as 
“creative destruction” in his book Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy 
"process of industrial mutation that incessantly revolutionizes the 
economic structure from within, incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly 
creating a new one." 
(Schumpeter, 1942) 
By observing the way in which businesses conduct that how individual entrepreneurs and 
corporate managers work for this dynamic economy Schumpeter found that innovation stimulus 
to economic development and without innovation, business survival and success are unattainable 
(Brouwer, 1991). For Schumpeter, innovation is the reason that opens new opportunities to take 
the economy to a higher growth trajectory. 
“[I]n capitalist reality as distinguished from its textbook picture, it is not 
[price] competition which counts but the competition from the new commodity, 
the new technology, the new source of supply, the new type of organization (the 
largest-scale unit of control for instance)–competition which commands a 
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decisive cost or quality advantage and which strikes not at the margins of the 
profits and the outputs of the existing firms but at their foundations and their very 
lives.” 
(Schumpeter, 1942) 
As the method towards development has been offered, The term ‘development’ is finally 
and firmly constructed on 20 January 1949, when Harry S. Truman, in his inauguration speech, 
declared the South as ‘underdeveloped areas’ and the United States as the most developed 
nation, standing at the top of the ladder where other industrialized nations follow (Esteva, 1997). 
“We must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our 
scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and 
growth of underdeveloped areas. More than half the people of the world are living 
in conditions approaching misery…The United States is pre-eminent among 
nations in the development of industrial and scientific techniques…our 
imponderable resources in technical knowledge are constantly growing and are 
inexhaustible…Such new economic developments must be devised and controlled 
to benefit the peoples of the areas in which they are established. Guarantees to 
the investor must be balanced by guarantees in the interest of the people whose 
resources and whose labor go into these developments. The old imperialism--
exploitation for foreign profit--has no place in our plans. What we envisage is a 




The dichotomy between developed and underdeveloped regions is created, and any 
democratic countries should escape from the undignified underdevelopment condition, to climb 
the ladder through development. Development stands as a lighthouse guiding people and 
governments, especially in the South, to put every effort towards and sacrifice for the only and 
ultimate goal of development (Esteva, 1997). 
The way to achieve development was also advertised to the rest of the world.  
After the above statement, Truman continued: 
“Greater production is the key to prosperity and peace. And the key to 
greater production is a wider and more vigorous application of modern scientific 
and technical knowledge.” 
(Truman, 1949) 
Since 1949, the message containing the relationship between technology, production, and 
prosperity, and the European modernity model, has been proclaimed in countless statements by 
both North and South nations. To innovate in science and technology promises the development 
and superiority over other lagged countries. By bringing innovation and development altogether, 
the model suggests that by the conquest of nature and persistently increasing productivity to 
restructure the underdevelopment areas into a predictable, and scientifically manipulable society, 
human happiness would be automatically produced (Ullrich, 1997). Now, governments around 
the world all regard economic growth, mainly means material prosperity and high quality of life, 
as major priorities, established a significant number of public policies stimulating innovation to 
promote regional economic growth (McCann & Ortega-Argilés, 2013). 
10 
 
2. Harmony as the Chinese traditional way of “Development” 
In contrast to the idea of becoming more materially prosperous, Chinese society for 
thousands of years praises values such as peace, harmony, and order. At least from the Zhou 
Dynasty (B.C.1046), the mainstream political philosophy emphasizes much on the order and 
morality, saying cultivating moral character is much more important than acquiring professional 
skills for the individual to be successful (德成而上, 艺成而下). Zhou dynasty established a set of 
manners and rules (礼/Li) guiding towards the ideal individual, gentleman (儒士/Ru shi, 
Confucian scholar), and ideal society, a society with peace and order.  
This system of rules encourages people to learn humanity knowledge and serve the 
society, otherwise, to diligently work on the farmland and raise their family. The businessman’s 
character of chasing profit and the craftsman’s skill of creating sophisticated techniques are 
regarded as unique but useless (奇巧淫记) that would possess people’s minds. Thus, these two 
professionals rank at the lowest in society according to the traditional hierarchy based on the 
occupation, while the Gentleman (士/shi, refers to Confucians with willing to serve others) and 
the Farmer receive higher respect. In traditional Chinese society, nearly all talents work hard to 
be a part of the bureaucratic system, leaving really few people to become scientists or 
businessmen (Table 1). 
Table 1. The statistics of ancient Chinese scientists from B.C. 1000 to A.D. 1840 
(From Du, 1993) 
Science sector Scientist Number Science sector Scientist Number 
Astronomy 56 Natural Geography 33 
Math 36 Chemistry 6 
Medicine 62 Physics 12 
Agriculture 35 Engineering 45 
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This traditional system creating thousands-of-years stableness and prosperous, but 
eliminated the long-term development of innovation, collapses from the middle of 19 Century, 
when China’s whole coast defense system faces threats from only three British warships, and its 
capital surrenders to 2,000 British and French soldiers. China uses the next entire century to find 
its modernity and most of trials fail. In 1910, an extreme and powerful revolution in thought 
spurred by the breaking homeland and aggressive invaders, crashed Chinese’s minds, especially 
among educated people, that Do not read Chinese traditional books (Lu, 1925) and Only science 
and democracy can save China (Xu & Wang, 2015).  
Innovation is perceived as a tool for development by the new republic established in 
1949. China takes the USSR as the developmental model, which emphasizes the importance of 
innovation but performances much less innovative than western models (People’s Daily, 1948-
2017). Scientists were lifetime employed by the state-owned institutes and were responsible for 
working full-time on tasks assigned by its upper authority, that the research system has a high 
transaction cost as institutes’ leaders is the only center of exchanging information between 
sectors, making plans, and assigning tasks to proper researchers. Research may be affected by 
political movements as well (Luo, 1981). 
The Sino-U.S. technology cooperation gives China opportunities to adopt a new model, 
to diffuse innovation to society rather than “being locked by the institute’s walls” (Zhao, 2018). 
When Chinese scientists were allowed to visit Western labs, they found Chinese scientific 
achievements lags a lot behind the global progress in the 1970s (Simon & Rehn, 1987). China 
starts to learn from innovation clusters to “unleash the potential of the density and quality of 
local talents to achieve modernizations of industry, agriculture, national defense, and science and 
technology” (Chen, 1980).  
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CHAPTER 2. INNOVATION AT THE CENTER OF A COMPLICATED SYSTEM 
 
When the idea of “technology diffusion” was introduced to China, Chinese actors read it 
from a relatively simple perspective—to develop industrial districts(People’s Daily, 1948-2017), 
because once firms clustered the positive external effect will be naturally created due to 
enhanced technological spill-over effect (Marshall, 1919), diversity (Jacobs), and competition 
(Porter, 1990). Chinese policymakers may learn from the SI approach based on its three 
distinctions. 
“Systems of innovation” framework reads innovation as the product of interactions 
between institutional and organizational elements, that are related to three burgeoning research 
areas (OECD, 1997). First, economists’ inquiry into the role played by innovation, the extent to 
which innovation concentrated and innovative agencies compose a regional system (Cooke et al., 
1997). Second, institutional analysis, research highlighted the function of institutions in 
economic systems surges, 'Institutions' have also become increasingly important in innovation 
theory. Institutions regulate innovations’ process and result, and innovations reinforce 
institutions or introduce new norms to existing institutional context (Cooke et al., 1998); Third, 
The systematic view on innovation. Different from the previous view on innovation that adopts 
an input-output method explaining the innovative performance as the direct result of the number 
of inputs, The SI approach emphasizes the innovation output depends on the performance of a 




1. Innovation: from periphery of production to the center of economic development 
The innovation factor is gradually introduced to economic development theories. 
Initially, development is regarded as can be easily achieved by using capital more smartly. Then, 
Schumpeter’s reframing illustrates that drastic innovation destructively leads economies to a new 
stage that sharply different from the former in terms of a group of indicators including 
productivity, average income, and the quality of goods, services, and life.  
During the late 19th century, post-Smith economists further developed production 
function where they first addressed fixed capital-to-labor ratios to explain the relationship 
between input and output. In 1888, American economist John Bates Clark discovered marginal 
productivity theory in which the capital-to-labor ratio varies and the marginal return diminishes 
when one input increases (Gordon & Vaughan, 2011). This is very close to the famous Cobb-
Douglas function (1928): Y=ALK. In their paper, although allocation between capital and labor 
remains their major concern. What they discovered as the constant “A” in their function, 
indicates that the productivity relates to, besides labor and capital, the technology that is applied. 
Technology consisting of the knowledge to transform primary inputs into final utilities could 
directly increase the final output.  
In the 1950s, neo-classical economics regards innovation as an exogenous indicator, that 
firms take given technologies in production. In the Solow Model, increasing capital to labor or 
labor to capital will result in consecutively smaller increments in output, while the cost of capital 
or labor will rise (Solow 1957). The model implies that the long-run growth cannot be sustained 
by capital accumulation alone. Also, the constant pressures of equalization of product prices and 
factor incomes among regions will easily enable poor countries to grow faster to catch up with 
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their richer counterpart But this cannot explain the growing global inequality, where the richer 
countries become richer, and the poorer become the poorer. 
The next generation neo-classical economists, represented by and Lucas, Romer, and 
Krugman develop Solow’s model by adding technology as a former element in the model. They 
emphasize that technology act as a distinct form of capital which leads to a permanently higher 
rate of productivity growth (Howitt & Aghion, 1998). Lucas (1988) regards technological 
progress as an unforeseeable factor, resulted from the external effect of human capital, and 
functioning on firms’ overall productivity. Romer’s (1990) AK model deals with innovation as 
an indigenous variable. There is a “learning-by-doing” process in the AK model that innovation 
comes from firms’ operation, firms can use knowledge to raise efficiency and raise the marginal 
product of capital. Krugman (1995) further relaxed assumptions to model the growth of 
agglomeration in terms of disequilibrium and cumulative causation. However, these models 
although pioneer by quantitatively incorporating innovations in theory but fail to account for 
firms’ institutional, technical, and investment change over time (Freeman 1994). 
Schumpeter views innovation sharply different from the above economists. For him, it is 
the entrepreneur that sits at the center of his innovation and economic development theories, who 
challenge the existing system and create a new by destroying the old (Foster & Kaplan, 2001). 
The daring entrepreneur produces economic development and the quality of entrepreneurship 
that define the quality and speed of innovation and growth. In his book published in 1934, “The 
theory of economic development,” Schumpeter described entrepreneurs as “the agent of 
innovation” and “the pivot on which everything turns” (Schumpeter, 1934).  
In Schumpeter’s view, entrepreneurship and innovation are two sides of a coin. 
Entrepreneurs find opportunities and innovate, and innovation commercializes the new idea and 
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defuse the benefit to the whole system (Feldman, 2016). He seminally establishes a text-book 
definition of innovation that broadly refers to new production processes, new products, new 
materials or resources, new markets; new forms of organizations (Schumpeter, 1934). Either one 
or the combination of them could be regarded as an innovation.  
Based on this approach, entrepreneurs are not only motivated by the innovation’s 
profitability but more importantly “the joy of creating” that takes them to a new and “private 
kingdom” (Schumpeter, 1934), and entrepreneurial firms do not compete through price and 
quantity, but improving technology, finance, and organization, seeking profits from a new boom 
of their products in the market (Leonard, 2009). All firms organize and finance to produce 
products for their target market, but there are sharp differences between strategies of optimizing 
firms and innovating firms (Lazonick 2006). In the past, theories mainly focus on optimizing 
firms which operate under the principles of traditional economic theories that seek the 
maximization of profits based on given constraints, including applicable technologies or market 
conditions. In contrast, innovating firms look for “historical transformations” to change those 
conditions that optimizing firms regard as constrains, by seeking opportunities for organizational 
or industrial innovations (Lazonick, 2002). Penrose (1959) argues that it is the innovative 
experience accumulation that enables innovating firms to have the expertise of reshaping 
productivity and taking advantage of new opportunities to avoid cost increasing and profit 
decreasing that limit the firm’s growth. The concept of “core competence” lies at the center 
of innovating firm's capability of achieving its intended result. Innovating firms would have over 
five “core competencies” backed by distinct “hard” technologies to stay competitive 
(Prahalad & Hamel, 1990). 
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For societies entering the era of “New Economy” from the “Old Economy,” Innovation is 
playing a more significant role. In the new economy, technology is both means and ends for 
production, since the development of a firm or society is not based on the use of scientific and 
technological knowledge, but the exploitation of old knowledge to create new knowledge 
(Norton 2000). The production process is decentralized and networked (Castells 1997), as the 
economic return for firms depends on invention and information sharing which Johnson (1992) 
calls ‘creative forgetting’, to leave the old knowledge and welcome the new. Keller (1998) 
distinguishes rules for old and new economies (Table 2). 
Table 2. Rules of Old and New Economies 
Source: Kelly (1998) 
Dimensions Old Economy New Economy 
Production Centralized Decentralized 
Firm’s strategy Maximize firm value Maximize network value 
Innovation Incremental innovation Disruptive innovation 
networks Place proximity cyberspace 
Technology Machine-focused technology human-focused technology 
Profit Constant return  Increasing return 
Cost of improvement Rising price Falling price 
Value Value Scarcity  Value Abundance 
 
2. Institution: informal conventions become more important 
Early evolutionary theorists who introduced the SI approach such as Freeman (1987), 
Lundvall (1992), Nelson (1993), and Edquist (1996), all identify the innovation-supportive 
environment as an important factor that helps innovation actors interact with each other and 
plays a key role in enabling firms to be innovative and systems to stay competitive over time 
(Uyarra, 2010).  
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The performance of an economic system rests upon the set of distinct institutions that 
jointly or individually “contribute to the development and diffusion of new technologies and 
which provides the framework within which governments form and implement policies to 
influence the innovation process” (Metcalfe, 1995). SIs should develop their institutions along 
with the following three dimensions: 1. Stronger absorption of new knowledge and innovation to 
reach the local demand; 2. More efficient diffusion of innovations throughout cooperative work 
among all actors; 3. Greater capacity in new knowledge generation (Nelson & Winter, 1992). 
Archibugi and Filippetti (2015) summarize critical institutions in an innovation system as six 
indicators: innovation and technological capabilities, openness, infrastructures, education, 
political institutions, and social cohesion.  
It is well recognized that informal channels play an important role in strengthening 
formal collaboration in and economic performance of an innovation system (OECD, 1997; 
Hawkins et al., 2016). In the knowledge economy, the speed of communication determines the 
competitiveness of the system (Cooke, 2002). Thus, the highly frequent interactive learning 
among actors in an innovation system requires minimal transactional cost (Lazaric & Lorenz, 
1998). The spatial proximity offers one solution that start-ups choose to stay in the industrial 
cluster as an incubator (Cooke, 2002). The institutional change is another, for reducing the 
uncertainties involved in interactions (North, 1990). As a complement to the formal institution, 
the informal institution, the reciprocative and cooperative conventions supported by trust and 
social capital plays a key role in successful regional development (Martin, 2000). 
The use of social capital composes a significant shift. It facilitates a more comfortable 
environment in an interaction comparing with the antagonism under the regulation of “formal 
politics” (Cooke, 2002); It also alters the centralized and vertically integrated interaction mode to 
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a more decentralized and networked mode (Henton et al., 1997). The encouragement of 
horizontal interactions between different professionals acts as the catalyst for innovation and 
economic development (Jacobs, 2000). In high-tech industries, such as telecommunications, 
biotechnology, ICT, and new media, where the production primarily relies on synthetic 
knowledge, firms cooperate at a large scale and production is achieved through temporary 
networks, in which actors work on each piece of out-sourced projects and cooperate via the 
internet. It requires a set of more efficient informal rules within the network (Cooke 2002).  
3. System: the Complexity of the Innovation Process 
The term system refers to “complexes of elements or components, which mutually 
condition and constrain one another, so that the whole complex works together, with some 
reasonably clearly defined overall function” (Fleck, 1992). The system has three characters: the 
system’s function, its components and relations among them, and a boundary to discriminate it 
from the outside of the system (Ingelstam, 2002; Asheim et al., 2011). It is clear that the function 
of SI is creating innovation. SI researchers study the complexity of different types of actors and 
their relationships in an innovation system mainly at the national and regional levels. 
3.1 Networked Actors in the System 
SI approach first comes up with the argument that there are actors and factors other than 
firms that play vital roles in the generation and diffusion of innovation. The pioneering SI 
researcher, Freeman (1987) Freeman reviews components of Japan’s SI, and identified four 
agents involved in the production of innovation: The Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry (MITI), company R&D, social innovations, and the structure of the industry. Lundvall 
(1992) theoretically classifies all elements supporting firms’ innovation in the NSI, including 
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financial and legal agencies, research and education systems, administrative branches, innovation 
policies, physical infrastructures et al.  
SI approach also reads the innovation process in a complex way. The linear view on 
innovation adopts an input-output method—standardizing the innovative outputs and inputs as 
indicators such as number research expenditure, and explaining the innovative performance as 
the direct result of the number of inputs. It just snapshots two stages of the whole innovation 
process and thus the plain explanation of innovation and development is unconvincing. 
“Innovation nowadays is an assemblage, including the new knowledge emergence and diffusion, 
as well as commercializing it into new valuable products” (Edquist, 1996). Autio (1998) divides 
an “SI” into to subsystems: knowledge generation subsystem including actors such as vocational 
training organizations, laboratories, and technology transfer agencies; and knowledge 
exploitation subsystem which commercializes new knowledge through firms. 
Beyond the complexity of the innovation process of each innovator, they also innovate in 
a networked form. As the growth of knowledge-intensive industries, sources of knowledge are 
widely distributed that no single entity has the capacity to have all knowledge to innovate and 
stay competitive. Because innovation is still crucial to improve competitive position, 
collaborative networks become the major mean of innovation (Powell & Brantley 1992). “Firms 
almost never innovate in isolation. but through a network involving multi firms, or even more 
institutes such as universities, governments” (Edquist, 1996). Also, “innovation occurs at the 
boundaries between mindsets, not within the provincial territory of one knowledge and skill base
” (Leonard 1995). The diversity of collaborators in a firm’s network allows it to have a wide 
range of knowledge stock, which added opportunities for the firm to innovate that it will have a 
better chance to survive in the rapidly changing industry (Beckman and Haunschild 2002).  
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Actors networked in various ways as well. Asheim (1998) distinguishes three types of SI 
at the regional level. The first type of SI is territorially embedded regional innovation systems or 
in Cooke’s terminology, “grassroots SI” (Cooke 1998), in which firms’ innovation comes from 
localized learning from other firms in the cluster, but the interactions with knowledge 
organizations are limited. The second type of SI, regionally networked innovation system has a 
more planned character— policy interventions intentionally strengthen the region's institutional 
infrastructure and encourage collaboration to increase regional innovation capacity, and both 
firms and organizations characterized by localized and interactive learning are embedded in the 
region. The regionally networked innovation system results from policy interventions and is the 
ideal type of SI, regionally clustered firms surrounded by supporting regional and institutional 
infrastructure, such as vocational training organizations or local R&D institutes (Asheim & 
Gertler 2006). This “network SI” is most typical in Germany and Nordic countries (Cooke 1998). 
The other SI type is called regionalized national innovation system, where the SI is integrated 
into national or international innovation systems that interactions with exogenous actors play a 
larger role in regional innovation. “Science parks” exemplifies this type of SI, where innovation 
is based on interactive learning within science parks themselves but rarely with local firms 
(Asheim & Cooke 1998).  
3.2 Innovation at National and Sub-national Scales 
Initially, SI researchers studied the innovation system at the national scale. Lundvall first 
introduces the idea of “national system of innovation”(NSI, Freeman, 1995). However, the 
expression was first published by Freeman in his book of analyzing the relationship between 
Japan’s economic performance and its SI. The orientation of the NSI framework has been to 
carefully present and compare between innovation systems in different countries, and try to 
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understand before reaching a theory (Nelson & Rosenberg, 1993). The demonstration of the need 
for developing a new development theory centered on interactive learning and innovation as an 
alternative to the neoclassical economics tradition is another fact drives the emergence of the SI 
approach (Lundvall, 1992)  
Later, concerning the complexness of analyzing SI at the national level, researchers start 
to study SI at the regional level to be more conceptually and methodologically accurate (Cooke 
et al., 1997). The regional innovation system (RIS) acknowledges the major contribution of NSI 
research, but derives from it to avoid the distortion and loss of information in NSI which 
hypothesizes a homogeneous innovation system at the national scale—the highly uneven pattern 
of innovation across the nation suggests a better direction of depicting innovation at a 
subnational level (Morgan, 2004). “Region” is a meso-level unit set between the national and 
local levels, which is a cultural or historical homogeneity that has statutory powers to generate 
innovation and support economic development within the region (Cooke, 2001). 
What RIS added is the spatial proximity’s role in a SI. Because a great part of knowledge, 
tacit knowledge, “is best shared through face-to-face interactions between partners who already 
share some basic commonalities: the same language, common ‘codes’ of communication and 
shared conventions and norms” (Asheim & Gertler, 2005). the clustering of economic and 
innovation-oriented activities “the more knowledge-intensive the economic activity, the more 
geographically clustered it tends to be” (ibid.). RIS assesses the appropriate regional economic 
trajectory, compares a region’s performance among systems; and finds out a region’s structural 
problems to prevent lock-in effect (Cooke & Morgan, 1998). 
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CHAPTER 3. COMPETING RATIONALES IN SI GOVERNANCE 
 
While the “systems of innovation” approach regards innovation as the center of a 
complicated network, rather than an accessional product of firms’ operation in neoclassical 
economists’ explanation. Policies get limited knowledge from SI research besides supporting 
individual firms in the form of R&D subsidies (Nauwelaers & Wintjes 2002). “Systems of 
Innovations” is a conceptual framework rather than a formal theory. The absence of well-set 
empirical regularities makes it hard to formulate conjectures for empirical testing. (Edquist, 
1997). Much SI research just offers inventory-like descriptions of a system, focusing on existing 
actors and institutions (Uyarra, 2010).  
A form of this theoretical ambiguity is the existence of two competing rationales 
supporting current innovation policies based on neoclassical and evolutionary theoretical 
foundations (Lundvall & Borrás 2006; Metcalfe, 1995; Verspagen, 2006). From the standard 
neoclassical economics on innovation, which emphases on non-interventionism, the “laissez-
faire” version of innovation policies adopted by Liberal market economies (LMEs) like the U.S. 
and UK take build frameworks for firms to fully compete and “pick the winners” at the end. 
Conversely, coordinated market economies (CMEs) including Japan and Germany select the 
“systemic” version of innovation policy which actively involves in the innovation process to fix 
institutional failures and facilitate linkages between firms within the innovation system (Lee & 
Yoo, 2007). 
For the transforming Chinese economy, from a planned to a market-oriented economy 
(Sun & Liu, 2010), the vague SI analysis offers recommendations going to divergent ways 
(Edquist, 2006). According to the classical economics tradition, government intervention can 
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only lead to the sub-optimize economic result, while the market mechanism leads to the 
optimize, that spurring innovation requires free entrepreneurs from state intervention. However, 
the systematic view on innovation argues for the intervene as long as systems fail to be actively 
open to change (Howells, 1999). More importantly, the reciprocal relationship between regional 
institutions and regional industries reveals the concept of co-evolution, which claims the actively 
evolving institution to fit the dynamism of regional economies and to prevent the region from 
locked-in (Nelson, 1994). This perspective echoes with the balanced growth doctrine in 
development planning studies (Nurkse, 1953; Mao, 1956), which requires an active state to 
directly participate in innovation and to regulate and intervene in the operation of SI. 
Although these two theoretical perspectives have sharp differences in explaining 
innovation and policy implications, scholars have not fully reached the agreement that which is 
the way to study innovation and to propose policy recommendations. For example, evolutionary 
SI researchers sometimes have a neo-classical view on innovation—adopting the input-output 
model in analyzing the innovative capacity (Nelson & Rosenberg, 1993) or supporting market-
led or incremental innovations in regional development (Lundvall, 1992). 
In practice, some research reveals that regions that adopt the neoclassical approach 
prizing personal control and autonomy have better economic performance, compared with places 
that dominated by a collectivist culture (Kyriacou, 2016). But empirical studies also suggest that 
firms’ embeddedness with the local economy through social capitals, such as family ties, have a 
greater chance to sustain (Polanyi, 1944; Granovetter, 1985). The explanation of innovation 
development patterns in different countries shows more divergence. One perspective argues that 
CMEs, compared with LMEs, are more likely to specialize in incremental innovation but fail 
behind in terms of radical innovation (Sorge, 1991; Hall & Soskice, 2001), as the government 
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has a strong role in organizing the research and industrial performance that suppresses 
entrepreneurship (Landes, 2003). Conversely, the other perspective reckons that radical 
innovations do not happen spontaneously in the market mechanism. Interventions, including 
policy support and public funding, are crucial especially in the early stages of the development of 
radical innovations (Edquist, 1999)  
1. Producing Innovation in the Neoclassical Approach 
The central of neoclassical economists’ argument is against the government’s 
intervention in firms’ production process, including innovation, that nearly has never changed 
since Adam Smith. 
1.1 The “laissez-faire” innovation creation and governance 
For Smith, the innovation looks like a natural product of specialization: 
“All the improvements in machinery, however, have by no means been the 
inventions of those who had occasion to use the machines…..Many improvements have 
been made by the ingenuity of the makers of the machines, when to make them became 
the business of a peculiar trade; and some by that of those who are called philosophers 
or men of speculation, whose trade it is not to do anything, but to observe everything; 
and who, upon that account, are often capable of combining together the powers of the 
most distant and dissimilar objects.” 
 (Smith, 1776).  
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He relies on the “invisible hand,” that individuals’ pursuit of self-interest through the 
personal choice of work and capital allocation, to explain the way in which the specialization 
will be integrated into the beneficial outcome for society. Trading will encourage experts to 
produce different innovations (Smith, 1776). Thus, he opposes government interventions which, 
back then, refers to those mercantilist arguments, such as restriction of free trade by duties, or 
even the prohibition of the importation of goods from foreign countries that could be 
domestically produced (Sun, 2005). 
It is the great multiplication of the productions of all the different arts, in 
consequence of the division of labor, which occasions, in a well-governed society, that 
universal opulence which extends itself to the lowest ranks of the people. Every 
workman has a great quantity of his own work to dispose of beyond what he himself has 
occasion for; and every other workman being exactly in the same situation, he is 
enabled to exchange a great quantity of his own goods for a great quantity, or, what 
comes to the same thing, for the price of a great quantity of theirs. He supplies them 
abundantly with what they have occasion for, and they accommodate him as amply with 
what he has occasion for, and a general plenty diffuses itself through all the ranks of the 
society. 
 (Smith 1776) 
From Smith, the most important role of government is to maintain the reinforcement 
between the division of labor and the exchanges of secured property, two fundamental pillars of 
civilized society (Whately, 1832). Also, investment in education to increase the benefit of 
26 
 
specialization and cultivate martial spirit to compensate for the cost of the division of labor in 
commercial society (Smith, 1776). 
Theorists that followed added other dimensions. Ricardo (1817) emphasizes the quality 
of labor. Then, Marshall (1919) points out that firms enjoy technology spill-over effect once they 
are in an industrial agglomeration. Innovation is treated as an ordinary exogenous variable to be 
easily purchased (Cooke, 2002). 
Current Neo-classical theorists, represented by Arrow, Lucas, and Romer, regard the 
competition leading to the falling of profit rate as the driver of innovation. Firms tend to invest in 
R&D to offsets the decrease (Grossman & Helpman, 1991). Each of these innovations produces 
new knowledge available for the whole economy, which increases the overall productivity and 
leads to development (Romer, 1990). While this rationale characterizes the R&D process as less 
uncertain. They rely on a “linear” innovation which assumes the sufficient support of Firms’ 
R&D, and the innovative input would translate into successful innovations that meet the market 
demands (Braun, 2008). “More tickets for the R&D lottery can be bought by doing more R&D” 
(Verspagen, 2006). 
The neoclassical economist approach describes a simple way to advance innovation. For 
individuals, the locus is the adoption of a positive attitude towards novelty, and the bravery to 
discard past knowledge and restrictive traditions (Brouwer, 2008). For firms, Learning-by-doing 
should be reckoned as the central in securing the core competencies, the more learning capacity 
the firms have, and the more diverse skills and technologies applied production, the more 
competitive the firm will be (Lawson, 1999). The government should stay away from the 
operation of the market, once it has been created and maintained the regulation such as 
protecting property rights or providing infrastructure (Dixit, 2008). Government intervention is 
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strictly limited, being legitimacy only when the market failure needs to be adjusted and the state 
has the ability to mitigate it (Edquist, 1999).  
1.2 Critics to the Neoclassical Approach 
The neoclassical approach quantitatively models innovation in economic development. It 
gained strong analytical consistency while lost a significant amount of details of the actual 
innovation process (Verspagen, 2006). The neoclassical approach is criticized for having a static 
view on society, the market usually stays equilibrium and rarely fails in classical economics 
models. However, in reality, once adopted a historical view on economic development, the 
“laissez-faire” approach is questionable.  
The neoclassical rationale is insufficient in three ways. First, the learning-by-doing 
approach they proposed defines the innovation process as cumulative and path-dependent—The 
routines of today are based on those of yesterday, as much as those of tomorrow are related to 
those of today (Nelson & Winter, 1982). It cannot explain the discontinued and radical 
innovations, which lie outside given trajectories but are Schumpeterian’s major source of 
economic development (Freeman & Perez, 1988). Second, their theory leads to market failure. 
As a large part of the innovation’s benefit goes to the public, not the private, firms will have less 
incentive to invest in innovation that the overall R&D investment will be low from the social 
perspective (Verspagen, 2006). Third, it fails to incorporate the cooperation and the complexity 
of relations between firms (Ahrweiler, 2010), if the competition is the sore mechanism.  
It fails to explain reality as well. The equalization of regional product prices and factor 
incomes predicted by traditional classical theory never achieved, the poor region stays poor 
(Eckaus, 1987). There is no evidence to convince how poor regions can benefit from the fast 
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development of rich regions (Higgins, 1983), as what ‘growth pole theory’ expected (Perroux, 
1955). The increasing returns to scale effect on the production of non-traded intermediate inputs 
were introduced to explain the geographically uneven development, that rich regions with better 
non-traded resources, such as physical infrastructure and technologies, will increasingly enjoy 
the goods with better quality but lower price, and the gap between the poorer regions and richer 
regions enlarges (World bank, 1983; Faini, 1984). To break the negative-feedback process actors 
of “follower regions” need to intervene in the market mechanism (Almeida et al., 2008)  
2. Synthetizing Innovation in the Systematic Approach 
Evolutionary scholars’ research reveals that economies transit through critical “stages” 
(Lewis, 1956). Societies develop continuously but slowly in different stages but dramatically and 
quickly when a new stage is coming (Kuznets, 1966). The understanding economic development 
as a process requires a strong role played by the collective, or its representative the regional 
government (Cypher & Dietz, 2008), to assist market and society preparing for rapid social 
transformations (Khan, 2007), which require ‘big push,’ coordination across sectors, to push the 
economy out of old trajectory and into a ‘take-off’ towards the new stage (Tan, 2008). Because 
individual firms motived by short-term profit do not have the incentive to invest in the radical 
change with the highly uncertain result (Feldman et al., 2016) 
2.1 Creating Innovation in the System 
The evolutionary worldview opens to the complications and space-time variation in the 
innovation process (Cooke, 2008). Evolutionary theorists view innovative activities as being 
embedded in networks, in which institutions guide actors’ cooperations (Block & Keller, 2009). 
Even in decentralized societies, innovative organizations are encouraged to in networks (Schrank 
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& Whitford, 2009). Evolutionary theorists first focus on two machines in the innovation process: 
ways that introduce novelties into the system, and give feedback to the generated innovation 
(Edquist, 1997; Nelson, 1987).  
For the first question, the systematic perspective finds that organizational learning creates 
innovation by combining diverse knowledge, but the learning is difficult due to the strong 
resistance to change the routine (Lawson & Lorenz, 1999). Entrepreneurs gain and 
commercialize innovative ideas based on their access to professional and local networks 
(Klepper, 2002). Jacobs (1969) observed the similar observation that breakaway firms tend to be 
the most innovative in a cluster. For an innovative firm, apart from the important role played by 
the entrepreneur in the firm, the CEO (Deschamps & Nelson, 2014) its internal governance 
structure and outside market structure significantly affect its innovation performance (Calderini 
et al., 2003).  
Compared with the neoclassical perspective, the evolutionary perspective argues that to 
be innovative, firms and regions need to augment their ability to accumulate and utilize 
knowledge through restructuring (Raco, 1999). This new idea links to the concept of “social 
capability” and “technological congruence” (Iammarino, 2005). The first concept relates to the 
entity’s ability to participate in the innovative process in a network, and the second determines 
the distance of the entity from the innovation frontier, or, its capability to transfer the diffused 
innovation (Fagerberg et al. 1994). 
The evolutionary inclination highlights concepts of relatedness (Frenken et al., 2007) and 
path dependence (Martin, 2010) drawn from economics theories, that significantly influence the 
innovation performance of a region. 
30 
 
Relatedness emphasizes the complexity of interrelated factors and relations between them 
in both innovation creation and economic development processes (Frenken et al., 2007). The 
belief here is that Evolutionary theorists generally consider three systemic features in a complex 
system: the number of inside actors, the density of internal links, and the system’s connections 
with the external environment (Bunge, 2000), as well as to measure the interdependencies and 
embeddedness in the system (Frenken, 2006), such as the social and political conflicts between 
actors in both public and private sectors (Dutton et al., 2012).  
Path dependence enquires the dynamic of relations within the system that is expected to 
change over time (Cypher & Dietz, 2008). It argues for a turbulent growth pattern because the 
old innovator who wants to secure its monopoly position by blocking competitions would be 
destroyed by the new innovator (Patel & Pavitt, 1997). Grabher (1993) comes up with three types 
of lock-in: functional lock-in, denotes the situation in which firms would not stow away its sunk 
cost, for instance, relationships with current customers and suppliers, that they resist changing; 
cognitive lock-in, refers to firms’ bounded rationality that limit them to look beyond their current 
applied technology, business model or market; political lock-in, happens when the political 
system or policies support the firms but effectively exclude start-ups, which will bring the whole 
system to a dead-end. 
SI researchers with the evolutionary perspective argue for solutions to prevent regions 
from to be trapped by lock-in (Martin & Sunley, 2006), by socially construct a more open and 
innovation-friendly institution (Garud & Karnøe, 2001). 
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2.2 Governing systematic failure 
The governance concept does not only refer to a top-down regulation from the 
government, but more nuancedly, strategies taken by individuals, organizations, and 
governments to deal with innovation (Rickne & Laestadius, 2012). From the planning 
perspective, this section writes from the perspective that the way governance reflects the 
coordination between state and social actors to reach a consensus and promote policy that can be 
credibly taken to represent the public interest (Frischtak, 1994; Bratton & van de Walle, 1992).  
Theories supporting outside interventions in the creation of innovation are clear (Evans, 
1992; Wade, 2004). The Wahington Consensus highlighted the stable government, appropriate 
policy, and orthodoxy public management at the core of development (Williamson, 1994). 
Institutions and economic policies were regarded as major factors accounting for the differences 
of wealth among nations (Olsen, 1996), and the economic outcomes significantly depend on the 
quality of institutions and governance (Dixit, 2008). The close relationship between innovation 
and growth calls institutional factors to mitigate conflict between the actors in innovation 
progress and create incentives for creating and adopting new technologies (Durlauf & Blume, 
2008). 
The evolutionary perspective underlines systematic failures resulting in firms being less 
innovative and competitive. There are six systematic failures that will impede the firms’ 
innovation process, and each of them could be mitigated by outside intervention: 1. Capabilities’ 
failure, Lack of competencies and resources to access knowledge/information; 2. Infrastructural 
failure, shortage of physical and knowledge infrastructures caused by the low return of the 
investment for private investors; 3. Hard institutional failure, defect of formal institutions such as 
laws that impede collaboration; 4. Soft institutional failure, Absence of informal institutions 
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including social norms or entrepreneurial spirit, that impede innovation; 5. Strong network 
failures, Too Intensive interaction within networks leads to the lack of new idea infusion; 6. 
Weak network failures: Too limited interaction within networks that inhibits interactive learning 
(Coenen et al., 2018). 
Unlike the doctrine neoclassical economic approach arguing that the only legitimate and 
necessary policy intervention is to adjust the market failure, the systematic approach justifies a 
pro-actively public intervention (Coenen et al., 2017).  
The systematic view does not deny that to be more innovative means to have more 
chance of failure, no matter how the innovative entity is structured—while facing radical 
innovations, markets, systems, and states, and governance all fails (Jessop, 1998). What the 
system can do is to coordinate individual strategies and reduce the likelihood of failure (ibid).  
Adequate “initiatives aiming at promoting innovation within the institutional context and 
those aiming at changing the institutional context in order to promote innovation” would solve 
the institutional failures and bring innovations (Lundvall & Borrás, 2006). Thus, in the 
systematic approach, government “hard” interventions, such as administrative directions or taxes 
give away to “softer” interventions, for instance, consensus building or public-private 
partnership. At the operational level, it is translated into a strategic mixing of policies, or “policy 
mix” (Flanagan et al., 2011) to encourage actors in the system to come up with an integrated 
development agenda (Kivimaa & Kern, 2016). The policy toolbox of “policy mix” covers 
regulatory, financial, and soft instruments, which are often referred to as “sticks,” “carrots” and 
“sermons” (Bemelmans-Videc et al., 2003).  
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Moreover, the role of governance is highlighted by the systematic approach. Firms in the 
post-Fordism competition need the innovative culture supported by regional governance capacity 
to stay at the forefront of innovation (González & Healey, 2005). Public funding crucially 
supports the R&D activities in ICT and Biotech industries, and creates successful clusters such 
as Silicon Valley (Nelson, 1959; Saxenian, 1994). It is important to reform universities to make 
them key actors to support regional economic and innovation development (Pugh et al., 2016), or 
support industries around research institutes to increase their “absorptive capacity” and use mass 
media as a tool to lead public discourse and increase participants (Werle, 2012), because 
otherwise the innovations from universities are likely to end up in labs if surrounding regions 
lack the capacity (Christopherson & Clark, 2007).  
OECD (2009) distinguishes the governance models of Neoclassical and Systematic 
approach and classifies into seven categories (Table 3).  
Table 3. Role of regional innovation agencies in different theoretical perspectives 
From OECD (2009a) 
 
Neoclassical Systematic 
Place of agency  Outside the system Actor in the system 
Role Top-down resource provider Facilitator, node in the system 
Rationale for 
intervention 
Market failure System failure, learning failure 
Mission Redistributing funds 
Identifying and reinforcing 
strengths in the system 
Instruments Isolated Policy mix 
Control mechanism Administrative and financial 
Strategic, goal-oriented, 
additionality 
autonomy Restricted to execution Expanded to strategic decisions 
 
Amin and Thrift (1994) introduce the concept of “institutional thickness,” a framework 
that can quantitatively evaluate a region’s development capacity in terms of its actors, 
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institutions, and interactions. First, the existence of a multiplicity and diversity of organizations 
is important (Cooke & Morgan, 1993). It is the condition of archive enough knowledge and 
qualified related variety for generating and absorbing innovation (Healey et al., 1995; Frenken et 
al., 2007 ); Second, the stable and high level of interactions between actors (Healey et al., 1995; 
Amin & Thrift, 1995) and smooth flow of innovation and people (OECD, 1997), which is both 
the mean and end of the social atmosphere of trust (Raco, 1998); Third, a shared imagination of 
the region’s future developed collectively (Healey, 2002), and the existence of a leading agency 
to “minimize sectionalism” and facilitate coordination (MacLeod & Goodwin, 1999). 
2.3 Critics of the Systematic Approach  
The systematic approach argues for theorizing innovation in reality and braces the 
complexity of the innovation process (Nelson & Rosenberg, 1993). However, the complexity 
also brings ambiguity and fails to build a theoretical framework incorporating different 
experiences — theorists’ contributions to this area are more loosely connected (Verspagen, 
2006). Also, the SI approach fails to serve as a foundation in helping and guiding policymakers 
to develop better policies and support an innovative environment (Doloreux & Porto Gomez, 
2017). Most SI researchers identify SIs’ character of the regional differences and focus on 
detailed descriptions of the systems such as their actors and institutions, arguing there is no one-
size-fits-all SI model and policy. But seldom researchers go a step further—“how can system of 
innovation (RIS) research handle the challenge of both developing coherent theoretical 
categories and developing policy strategies for building a system of innovation (RIS) (Doloreux 
& Porto Gomez, 2017)?” Also, if it is not followed by investigating, what are functions, roles, 
and relationships in the system (ibid.).  
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The problem can be mainly attributed to the little known about the “innovative act” itself 
(Cooke, 2013). It is clear innovation comes from entrepreneurs, but questions remaining such as, 
how do they innovate, why some organizations are more innovative than others, how to 
practically create an environment for innovation. Storper (1997) thinks dominated innovation 
research focuses much on traded relationships such as market relations (user-producer linkages) 
or technology transfers (university-industry relations), but overlooks untraded relationships 
which invisibly bond interdependencies together in a system. Thus, current policies that sought 
to shape a system of innovation, often success in generating economic growth, in terms of 
employment or income level (Castells & Hall, 1994), but fail to develop a network in which 
firms interactively deal with collective problems (Cooke, 2002). 
In all, the systematic approach is far from a satisfactory one. Innovation policy needs an 
evolving SI research to help it build a strategic framework to ensure sustainable development. 
(Lengrand et al., 2002).  
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CHAPTER 4. CHINESE EXPERIENCE IN THE FUTURE SI RESEARCH 
 
What the lack of solid SI theory in practice is: on the one hand, economic development 
policies have come been presented by “successive waves,” each representing a distinct phase 
with different theoretical logics and political intentions (Blakely & Leigh, 2013). On the other 
hand, the translation from SI theories to practice is difficult. For example, the “institutional 
thickness” framework supports that innovative regions should have a thick knowledge stock. In 
reality, the effect of policies aiming at introducing knowledge-intensive employment (Harrison, 
1978) or “creative class” (Florida, 2002) is facing great challenges (Peck, 2005). Also, public 
funding is commonly regarded as a key to incubate innovative start-ups. But there are various 
ways to fund innovation, that it could go to individual entrepreneurs, clusters, or industries (or 
the subfield of industries), or to subsidies the process or result of innovation (Clayton et al. 2019, 
Nauwelaers & Wintjes 2002 ). SI researchers may further ask which is the most effective 
mechanism? 
In this section, I summarize current SI research’s deficiencies into four categories: the 
limited scope on specific geographical scales, regions, and historical experience, as well as 
limitations on thinking about SI’s negative effect. I think, because of the contextual uniqueness 
of Chinese innovation systems, the study on them may effectively respond to the above issues. 
1. A boundarylessness Innovation System 
I call the first limitation as the scale deficiency, referring to that SI research did not offer 
a “standard theory” of innovation systems, rather, stratifying systems into at different scales—
levels of sectoral, regional, national, or global (Binz & Truffer, 2017).  
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In innovation systems, mechanisms that lead innovation are the same of different relating 
to the spatial scale (Lorenzen, 2005). What fundamentally differs them and by what mechanism? 
Iammarino (2005) argues that the innovation system at the national level cannot be considered as 
the simple sum of regional systems, that at least interactions between regional systems need to be 
included. But what are interactions/relationships between networks working at different levels 
remain unanswered. Empirical studies conclude that regional factors play an important role 
resulting in the different performance of innovation systems (Martin et al., 2017), and local 
governance actively promotes local economic development (Howells, 2005). Bennet and 
McCoshan (1993) think that the national-support system is weak at the local scale as it is 
centralized and deficient. But Carrincazeaux and Gaschet (2015) find that national institutions, 
rather than regional, play as fundamental importance in shaping regional configurations. Also, 
firms stably anchored in the national institutional systems are the most innovative actors (Werle, 
2012). The problem is not innovation system at which scale works best, but to utilize studies on 
sectoral, regional, national, and global innovation system, to build an overall framework on the 
system of innovations (Chung, 2002). 
The concept of SI does not necessary to have a spatial attribution to classify which level 
of SI, rather than the other, a firm is belonged to. The definition of an innovation system is 
defined in terms of the flow of knowledge rather than the flow of ordinary goods or services. 
(Carlsson & Stankiewicz, 1991).For a firm, its network refers to “a close set of selected and 
explicit linkages with preferential partners in a firm's space of complementary assets and market 
relationships” (Camagni, 1991). Organizations will connect to any actors in their network to 
quickly build new competencies. The extent to which they attract resources from, from the 
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region to the globe, depends only upon its absorptive capacity (Cantwell & Iammarino, 2003). 
The System of innovation should be dynamic and boundaryless.  
When promoting regional development, it is challenging to consider poising local 
innovation systems towards a SI at a larger scale, towards regional, national, or global (Rickne et 
al., 2012).  
Because for many firms, their markets are already international, not mention national 
(ibid.). Both local relationships and “global pipelines” determine firms’ innovative performance 
(Bathelt et al., 2004). In some regions, firms tend to decouple from the local network and search 
for foreign complementary capabilities (Asheim & Herstad, 2005). The challenge is balancing 
resources that regional innovation formation process needs with what being incorporated into a 
larger one requires (Rickne et al., 2012). Such as to make a clear distinction between the local 
network dominated by local informal norms with the outside market regulated by laws—an 
overly strong regional network can make the region isolated from the world (Cooke, 2002). 
In China, policies from the Central government play a key role in the development of 
different levels of SIs (Sun &Liu, 2010). While, in SI research, the relationship between an SI at 
regional and national scale remains unclear. On the one hand, the concept of regional innovation 
system (RIS) derives from the concept of the national system of innovation (NSI), defining a SI 
at the regional scale— “the localized network of actors and institutions in the public and private 
sectors whose activities and interactions generate, import, modify and diffuse new technologies 
within and outside the region” (Howells, 1999). On the other hand, scholars argue that an NSI 
cannot be reckoned as the sum of its RISs (Holbrook 2005), otherwise, the interactions between 
RISs would be missed, “a country’s innovation performance will depend not only on how it 
performs on each element of the NSI, but how these separate elements interact” (OECD, 2003). 
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Global, national and regional elements all play important roles in Chinese innovation 
systems’ development. The development of the system starts from the 1980s, when Chinese 
actors try to “copy” the Silicon Valley to China and experience of science and technology cities 
(SNTs) across dozens of countries were drawn (Gu, 1996). FDIs and Transnational firms play a 
significant role in the development of Chinese technology industries (Yu & Zhang, 2006), that 
innovation clusters in China pay a great effort in building connections with global firms and 
clusters (People’s Daily, 1948~2017). The state started the first innovation system program 
named “China Torch Program” and a governance agency was formed at different administrative 
levels to coordinate innovation projects, including developing national innovation clusters. 
Initially, the state plays a significant role in the system and it is gradually giving control of the 
system back to firms, but it still takes the charge of making policies and measurements for the 
system and firms in the system (Sun &Liu, 2010). But the performance of innovation systems 
varies dramatically in different places, although they are all regulated by the same national 
policy. Regional institutions determine the regional innovation system’s innovative outputs (Li, 
2009).  
Research on China’s innovation systems would complement the research to break 
boundaries between different scales of innovation systems. We may ask what global, national, 
and regional elements that influence specific innovation processes, and how could the system of 
innovation utilize all these factors? Hsing (1996) finds that local authorities have great flexibility 
to negotiate with small foreign firms and attract them with competitive institutional and physical 
advantages. While the national influence usually works with giant transnational companies. 
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2. Innovation system that is developing 
Current SI research selected a very limited number of cases. First, empirical studies have 
been focused mostly on innovation systems advanced economies (Nelson, 1993), and two-thirds 
of the published SI research articles focus on regions in Europe (Doloreux & Porto Gomez, 
2017). I call this the horizontal deficiency that the selected cases are limited to a small fraction of 
all regions. Second, SI research statically analyses “full-blown systems” without providing how 
the system developed and evolved (Asheim et al., 2011). I name it as the chronic deficiency that 
researchers did not further enquire about the mechanism that drives the development of 
innovation systems. 
There is indeed no “one-size-fits-all” innovation policy—no single model or “policy 
mix” available and suitable for every region (Morisson & Doussineau, 2019). Because effective 
policy instruments are sensitive to context (Tödtling & Trippl, 2005), and regions with different 
institutions, industrial base, and innovation capabilities require the design and implementation of 
place-based policies addressing the specificities (Barca et al., 2012). 
Researchers have analyzed innovation systems in many regions. For example, experience 
from Swiss highlights the innovation policy of providing high-level infrastructures of education 
and research institutes, that offer human capital to innovation systems (Hotz-Hart, 2012). In 
Germany’s SI, where medium-tech industries clustered, its government focuses on developing 
high-skill labor force (Prais, 1981; Orlowski, 2012), while also actively work with industries 
through establishing industrial regulations and coordination towards a new form of policy 
network (Lang & Mertes, 2012; Fuchs & Wassermann, 2012). In the U.S., scholars link the 
countries’ high innovation performance in history and recent weaker performance to the 
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historical multifaceted government support on innovation and the absence of national innovation 
policy recently (Bauer, 2012). 
To include more regions especially those with weak innovation capacities benefits these 
“follower” regions (Almeida st al., 2011) and SI research itself as well. First, it helps with 
solving practical issues in “follower” areas. These regions face intense pressure to “catch-up” 
with the innovation frontier (Lundvall et al., 2009). In this context, followers need radical 
innovations in policy to promote internal interactions and external connectivity to cope with 
global competition (Almeida st al., 2011).  
Second, given the broadly accepted academic recommendation of place-sensitive policies 
and the absence of solid insights into how to design these policies (Morisson & Doussineau, 
2019), investigating more innovation systems help with testing extant hypnosis and introducing 
new alternatives. Policy recommendations from SI research should be concrete enough to tell 
policy-makers the effectiveness or limitations of model policies when they were applied in their 
regional environment (Dixit, 2009). Although arguments state that innovation systems differ 
based on innovation itself, rather than the geographic places they locate in (Trippl et al., 2009), 
its reliability counts on being tested in more regions. 
Moreover, taking different regions and industries into account in SI studies consolidates 
its statement about the way in which institutions co-evolve as the economic dynamics. Current SI 
research developed from the experience of technology-advanced nations in the 1980s, when they 
are entering to the post-industrial stage (Bell, 1973). SI theories that focus on the complicated 
organization of advanced technology industries (Saxenian, 2007), provide limited knowledge on 
ways of innovation governance rested on different historical conditions (Rickne et al., 2012). 
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On the one hand, SI research should consider the real system in which some parts are 
highly advanced and the other use low-tech components as complementary, because the 
distinction between high-tech and other industries is unclear (Bauer et al. 2012). On the other 
hand, for SI research on less developed regions, it should echo with the reality that innovation 
must take place in traditional manufactures and a new way of developing technology-intensive 
firms would be different from the experience of developing countries (Fiore et al., 2011). As new 
industries, that interact with regions differently from old ones, introduced to the system, SI 
research may need to think about a compatible institution. This is a part of how to deal with time 
deficiency. 
China offers a unique context for innovation systems research (Sun & Liu, 2010). First, 
Chinese SI can offer an experience where innovative practices are not rooted in a traditional 
market economy. China distinctions for its “highly capitalistic market economy regulated by a 
Communist party funded on Marxist ideas with a population that is mainly influenced by 
Confucianism” (ibid.). The context difference may help with filtering or testing what formal or 
informal institutions work or fail in innovation processes. 
Second, China is the only country that has the simultaneous development of industries of 
labor- capital- and technology-intensive at the national scale (Williams et al., 2011). As stated 
above, how Chinese innovation systems address industries’ different needs is off the topic of 
global SI research. Many Chinese regional innovation systems develop based on labor-intensive 
or “low-tech” industries such as wood, seed, agriculture, ceramics. In order to increase the 
efficiency in its production, and regions’ income level (People's Daily, 1948~2017).  
Last, during the past decades, the nature of Chinese innovation change at an ever speed, 
Chinese entities applied for 781 patents in 2000, accounting of 2% of patents the U.S. 
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organizations applied, and in 2019, the number went to 58,990, ranking the first among the 
number of patents application received from other countries (Zhang, 2018; Chinese Central 
Government, 2019). Along with the evolution, institutions of Chinese SI transform from a 
planned to a market-oriented economy (Sun & Liu, 2010). This experience may help to reflect on 
the way in which the institutions of SI change to fit with the market change, and what 
mechanism allows the flexible institutional changes that happened just in a few decades.  
3. Addressing the effect of innovation system development 
Most SI research theories have a value-neutral position, but when the innovation process 
involves urban governance, it cannot be value-neutral (Pierre, 1999). SI research needs to discuss 
more the imbalance relationships among actors in the system and the imbalance effect the 
innovation development result in to harness the innovation for sustainable development (Cash et 
al., 2003). There are three aspects related to this topic that has been discussed. 
First, the power within the regional innovation system is noted but insufficiently 
theorized by SI researchers (Christopherson & Clark, 2007a).In a territorial innovation system, a 
value-neutral transnational corporation (TNC) contributes to the whole region through two 
mechanisms: taking the leadership to organize and sponsor the innovation initiatives, and acting 
as antennas to introduce global partners into the system (Kramer et al., 2011). But this promise 
rarely reaches, according to empirical studies, and even worse, TNCs lead to the “creation of 
volatility” and “destruction of skills” (Kristensen & Zeitlin, 2005). The goal of TNCs is to 
suppress innovations from others to sustain their own comparable competitiveness, and they 
have the extra and extraordinary power, compared with other firms in the network, to influence 
governments to set agenda and control innovation resources such as the access to research 
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institutes and high-skill labor (Christopherson & Clark, 2007b). They could either be innovative 
through selectively uniting regional firms to compete on the global stage, or reversely, to squeeze 
competitive small or middle-sized firms out of the region (ibid.).  
Thus, if power and relationship are overlooked by SI research, the result of its policy 
recommendations would be divorced from the positive track predicted by policy designers. A 
value-neutral perspective could overlook small firms’ needs and overly prize the role played by 
TNCs in an innovation system, due to their greater amount of innovative resources. And in 
reality, it is, policies usually prone to TNCs (Feldman et al., 2002), and over-subsidize these 
large firms and under-subsidize small firms (Harrison, 1994). But it is the small or medium-sized 
firms that make regional development innovative and sustainable (Clark et al., 2010). To be 
competitive, small or middle-sized firms are able to advance their technology and keep ahead of 
the markets (Pyke et al., 1990; Cooke & Morgan, 2000).), But they lack the resources to cash in 
their innovative advantages that make them vulnerable in market competition, (Crouch 
&Voelzkow, 2004). 
Few SI researchers discuss the social impact of innovation development. It seems the 
innovation would increase inequality rather than diminish it. In twenty years from 1960 to 1980, 
the economic gap between Northern and Southern countries doubled, as the more advanced the 
technology they have and apply, the quicker growth they will have (Sachs, 1997). The effect of 
innovation development on regions is unclear. To be more innovative may help the region with 
less absolute poor people, but may increase the income inequality that the quality of life for all 
people could be a problem (Chapple et al., 2004). Innovation studies have been mainly 
considered the development approach of using innovation to produce economic growth, while 
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little from the distributive perspective—whether the innovation will hamper or encourage the 
supports civic participation and representation (Clark & Christopherson, 2009).  
Research on Chinese innovation systems may first echo with the current debate on the 
imbalance power that firms have. Uniquely, one of the Chinese major actors in the innovation 
process is state-owned enterprises (SOEs) (Liu & Ren, 2007), which is often regarded as 
inefficient or underperforming in production with a complicated corporate governance structure 
(Liao, 1009). Comparing with private enterprises, they are better subsidized by public funding 
and have a higher level of R&D investment (Dai & Cheng, 2015). How SOE’s roles differ from 
TNC’s in an innovation system, and how did the Chinese system incorporate with SOEs are open 
to further SI researchers. 
What Chinese experience opens the door for global studies is the use of innovation and 
development as the tool to treat inequality. Many developmental policies in China have the 
orientation of diminishing inequality, such as the Central-to-Local Governments' Transfer 
Payments aiming at funding towards poorer provinces (Yeoh, 2009), or the project of 
“Characteristic Towns” that develop rural towns through transferring innovative resources from 
the urban and cultivating distinctive rural innovation systems (Sheng & Zhang, 2016). Studies on 
Chinese systems whose fundamental goals including promoting regional equality will 






This literature review writes from the perspective that how Chinese SI experience could 
be incorporated into the global innovation study, in terms of how global and Chinese SI practices 
initiated; what lessons Chinese SIs can learn from SI research; and how Chinese SI development 
cases may complement current theories. 
Once the concept of “development” was spread around the world, regions especially 
those “followers” who stay far from the development and technological levels of the frontier 
regions, restructured their government and institutions to foster innovation and increase 
productivity (Almeida st al., 2011). This is also the historical background of Chinese SI 
development. In the 1980s, the national SI program started to catch up with world scientific 
progress and spur local economy. The globalization has drastically changed the competitive 
environment, in which both firms and regions have to confront intensive price, time and quality 
competition in international as well as domestic market (Teece, 2007), and once prosperous 
places struggle to redefine themselves on the global stage (Christopherson et al., 2010). Thus, the 
cognition of developing through innovation becomes widespread to all regions, both developed 
and developing economies, to stay competitive, develop sustainably, and face future economic 
turbulence. (Cooke et al., 1998; Feldman et al, 2016). The major responsibility of SI research is 
to find innovation recommendations to address practical needs (Doloreux & Porto Gomez, 
2017).  
SI research may help Chinese policymakers to understand the complicated innovation 
process, in which: 1. Innovation is at the center of the system, the function of SI is to innovate. 
Especially in the current “New Economy” era, innovation becomes both the mean and end of 
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development; 2. institution plays an important role. The SI researchers regard the environment 
that supports actors in an innovation system to be a crucial factor determining the system’s 
performance. Social capital that closely links actors together enables the SI to function more 
effectively; 3. Innovation is created through networked actors. Countless human and non-human 
actors involve in innovation, and they have worked in various forms and on different scales.  
However, SI researchers fail to offer a formal theoretical framework to guide 
policymakers. This thesis writes about two competing rationales in current SI research. One roots 
in traditional classical economics, arguing the innovation is produced by organizations’ daily 
operation (learning-by-doing), that firms especially CEOs in the firm should have full autonomy 
in their business and the system will have the best innovative result (Deschamps & Nelson, 
2014). The other one, systematic approach develops from the evolutionary perspective, arguing 
that characters of the innovation system, such as its stock of innovation resources, its relatedness 
with other systems, and its ability to incorporate and diffuse innovation, influence the production 
of innovation. A governance body may actively evolve with the economic dynamics, to intervene 
in the SI once it faces system failure that it fails to fully use its innovative capacity. This 
theoretical ambiguity provides the transforming Chinese SIs a contradict recommendation: To 
keep opening-up and have a stronger market, or to maintain a strong government cultivating 
local innovation environment and keeping reform to push the market to a higher trajectory.  
Finally, incorporating Chinese cases, SIs from a distinct context may complement 
deficiencies of scale, selected cases, and considering the negative effect of SI development in SI 
research. First, compared with current SI research that breaks innovation systems according to 
their scale, and into categories of sectoral, regional, national, and global, Chinese SIs have clear 
connections with elements at all spatial scales. Theorizing Chinese experience may help SI study 
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to develop a more general framework explaining how SI at different levels interacts with each 
other. Second, current SI research gain theories from technologically advanced regions, such as 
Europe, U.S., and Japan. The fast-growing Chinese SIs from a unique cultural and institutional 
background would shed light on how SIs and the economy they locate in co-evolve from a lower 
level to a higher level of technical advancement status. Third, the Chinese experience could open 
a discussion about how to use innovation to create equality, while SI research is criticized to 
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